

families were lost in the assault, the authors believe that several hundred Koreans were killed over several days of attacks in late July.

The authors describe the racism of American soldiers and other misdeeds of the United States military, including strafing of refugees by the American air force and the blowing up several bridges loaded with non-combatants. The authors studied the long-term impact of the conflict on civilians and soldiers and found, not surprisingly, that perpetrators and victims alike suffered significant trauma. This book should be read by anyone interested in the history of modern warfare. It shows how excellent research, combined with oral history, can shape our understanding of events hidden out of fear, government propaganda, and the cold war.

#### KEYSTONE

The American occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese relations  
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes

College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000, 264pp, US\$34.95,  
ISBN 0-89096-969-8

Sarantakes examines the contemporary history of American relations with Okinawa, an island located in the Ryukyu chain about 1,000 miles south of Tokyo in the East China Sea. The Ryukyus had been incorporated into Japan in 1879, but the United States military acquired them during the Second World War. Although some of the northern islands were returned to Japan in 1953, the United States military governed Okinawa from 1945 to 1972. Under the Japanese Peace Treaty, Japan retained 'residual sovereignty' over the Ryukyus, but Sarantakes argues that this was a legal fiction, and that Okinawa was an American colony. Many Okinawans objected to American rule.

The book highlights a number of incidents that placed the local population at odds with their American overseers. In 1956, the people of Naha elected a mayor who belonged to the island's communist party. When the American military commander passed regulations that facilitated the mayor's removal from office, the city elected a socialist. In 1962, the conservative Okinawan legislature passed a resolution that referred to the United States as a colonial power. America held on to Okinawa because the island was a 'keystone' of its strategy in the Pacific and because the military lobbied forcefully to retain it. Until the mid-1960s, United States economic aid was 'the key to gaining

Okinawan acquiescence to American rule' (p 61). But a visit to the island by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in August 1965 led to an increased flow of Japanese funds to Okinawa and helped to spark discussions that eventually returned the Ryukyus to Japan.

Unlike the Pentagon, the Department of State tended to argue that the formal retention of Okinawa jeopardized the American-Japanese relationship. Officials believed the United States could continue to hold on to its bases after the island was re-incorporated into Japan as a prefecture. This position eventually prevailed. Prime Minister Sato and President Richard Nixon issued a joint communiqué in November 1969 announcing that the reversion would be complete by 1972. In the final agreement, the Americans retained their bases and could consult the Japanese government about stationing nuclear weapons on the island in the event of an emergency. In the mid-1990s, a Japanese diplomat revealed that the 1969 communiqué contained a secret agreement, purported to have granted the United States the right to activate its nuclear storage facilities in Okinawa 'without delay.' Sarantakes's well-researched and thoughtful analysis of a relatively neglected topic underscores the influential role of the United States military in shaping American foreign policy decisions in the first two postwar decades. His book makes a fine contribution to our understanding of the character of America's postwar informal empire in the Pacific.

#### CONFLICT UNENDING

India-Pakistan tensions since 1947

Sumit Ganguly

New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, 187pp, US\$18.50, ISBN 0-231-12369-8

Ganguly provides a succinct analysis of the four Indo-Pakistani Wars between 1947 and 1999. He argues that conflict between India and Pakistan was a consequence of competing ideologies related to Indian and Pakistani concepts of state-building. Indian politicians conceived their nation as a secular entity based on civic nationalism, whereas for Pakistani leaders their country was an Islamic state that would serve the needs of all Muslims in South Asia. From the outset of independence, both countries believed they had legitimate interests in Kashmir, a majority Muslim area that had joined the Indian federation in the